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The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad 
Business of Unlimited Patent Protection 
for Methods of Doing Business 
Leo J. Raskind* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Circuit’s recent endorsement of patent protection 
for methods of doing business marks so sweeping a departure from 
precedent as to invite a search for its justification.1  Unfortunately, 
this quest cannot usefully begin with a review of the prior prece-
dents, for a coherent analysis of the denial of patent protection for 
business methods—the so-called “business method exception”— 
was not developed in the earlier cases.  Those courts essentially 
rested their denials of claims for business method patents on the 
ipse dixit that patent protection was limited to technology, i.e., to 
tangible things and to physical procedures.  Business method 
claims were treated as falling below the threshold of statutory sub-
ject matter.  Some of those claims were rejected on traditional 
grounds of lack of novelty and non-obviousness, although many 
opinions recited the business method exception.2 
 
 * Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  The author gratefully acknowledges the 
constructive comments and suggestions of Richard H. Stern and Victor Zowana.  This 
paper was originally delivered on March 25, 1999 at a symposium on intellectual prop-
erty rights in computer-related technology at The George Washington University Law 
School, cosponsored by Oracle Corporation. 
1. State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 851 (1999). 
2. See, e.g., Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908) 
(stating dictum that a method of doing business is ineligible for patent protection). After 
Hotel Security, however, two patents on business methods were upheld in terms of the 
physical structure implementing the method.  See Rand, McNally & Co. v. Exchange 
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The Federal Circuit has now flatly rejected the business 
method exception.3  However, the recent decision which an-
nounced this startling conclusion provides neither explanation, 
limitation, nor rationale.4  What is clear and unqualified is that 
business methods are now statutory subject matter in full parity 
with other innovative activity.5  As Judge Rich put it: 
We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception 
to rest. Since its inception, the “business method” excep-
tion has merely represented the application of some gen-
eral, but no longer applicable legal principal. . . .  Since the 
1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and should 
have been, subject to the same legal requirements for pat-
entability as applied to any other process or method.6 
Whether the prior doctrine was ill-conceived and whether there 
are public interest or economic policy foundations for now extend-
ing patent protection to business methods is the topic of this paper. 
 
Scrip-Book Co. 187 F. 984 (7th Cir. 1911) (holding a coupon book of travel units pat-
entable); Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443 (6th Cir. 1913) (holding a railroad 
coupon book with detachable parts patentable); In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A. 
1934) (denying protection to “an ingenious and convenient arrangement” to transfer 
funds as lacking the requisite “physical structure”); In re Wait, 73 F.2d 982 (C.C.P.A. 
1934) (holding a process of communicating contract terms and recording their acceptance 
held unpatentable.); In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (denying a patent for a 
fire-protection system); Loew’s Drive-In Theaters, Inc. v. Park-In Theaters, Inc., 174 
F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1949) (holding unpatentable a scheme for parking automobiles in an 
open lot); Ex parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1819 (Bd. Pat. App. 1988) (holding an 
accounting analysis of expenses held an unpatentable method of doing business); In re 
Schrader, 22 F.3d 290,296 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) (rejecting patent for 
a method of competitive bidding on many items). However, a patent was issued on a fi-
nancial service method of combining a margin brokerage account with money market 
funds and a checking/charge account in Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 1358 (D.Del. 1983).  The leading trea-
tises also recognize the business method exception. See D.S. CHISUM, 1 PATENTS § 
1.03[5] & § 1.02 [4] (1998) (noting that the “printed matter” exception had served as an 
alternative ground of denial of business method patents); See also, Lewis v. Pennsylvania 
Steel Co., 59 F. 129 (3d Cir. 1893); Louis Koutoulakos, Note, The Patentability of 
Printed Matter: A Critique and Proposal, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475 (1950); P.D. 
ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6.02[3][b] (2d ed. 1997). 
3. See State Street Bank,149 F.3d at 1374. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 1375 (emphasis added). 
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Other papers in this Symposium will probe the reasoning and use 
of precedent in the State Street Bank opinion, the requisite adjust-
ments in interpretation of the Patent Statute to implement this di-
rective, the possibility of legislative implementation, and role of 
the Patent Office in administering this new protection for business 
methods.7 
This paper addresses the justification of patent protection for 
methods of doing business by posing two questions.  First, what 
guidance, if any, does economic analysis offer to support the new 
rule on the patentability of business methods?  Second, how does 
this extension of proprietary rights directly to marketplace prac-
tices affect competition?  This latter inquiry, in turn, requires some 
consideration of the traditional interface between patent rights and 
the antitrust laws.8 Although the opinion in the State Street Bank 
case makes no mention of the competitive impact of this new ex-
tension of protectible subject matter, there is a settled line of case 
law subjecting patent licensing practices to judicial scrutiny under 
the doctrine of patent misuse.9 
 
7. The Patent Office has hired new examiners with Business School training to pro-
cess the rising volume of business method patents.  A “Boom” in Business Method Patent 
Filings Has Followed State Street Banking Ruling, PTO Says, ELEC. COMMERCE & L. 
REP. (BNA) 1393 (Dec. 16, 1998); see also, infra text accompanying notes 12-14. 
8. The impact of patent protection on competition has traditionally subjected patent 
licensing and related practices to antitrust scrutiny. Justice Black noted, “The grant of a 
patent is the grant of a statutory monopoly. . . .”  Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 
U.S. 225, 229 (1964).  Recently the antitrust enforcement agencies have noted the poten-
tial for patent practices to generate impediments to competition as follows:  “Intellectual 
property law. . .[patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secret law] bestows on the 
owners. . .certain rights to exclude others. . . .  [A]s with other forms of private property, 
certain types of conduct with respect to intellectual property may have anticompetitive 
effects against which the antitrust laws can and do protect. 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST & TRADE 
REG. REP.1708 at S-3 (April 13, 1995). 
9. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873) (finding patent misuse for pat-
entee to impose territorial limits); Motion Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. 
Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (finding patent misuse to tie purchase of an unpatented product 
to patent use); see also Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (rec-
ognizing patent misuse as a valid defense against a patent infringement claim).  Misuse 
has also been extended to copyrighted material. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 
U.S. 339 (1908) (finding it misuse to set minimum resale price); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. 
Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding anticompetitive license clauses to be 
misuse). See also Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misusing Antitrust: The Search for Functional 
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These questions are addressed initially by reviewing the eco-
nomic analysis of the role and function of patents as a possible 
economic footing for the grant of patent protection to methods of 
doing business. To state the conclusion in advance of an offer of 
proof, the economic analysis of patent protection does not support 
the extension of patent protection to methods of doing business. 
Both economic theory and empirical studies of patent-intensive in-
dustries cast doubt on the premise that patent protection of busi-
ness methods is required either as an incentive for innovation or as 
an ingredient of the efficient diffusion of business methods in the 
economy.  Indeed, there is a case to be made against such exten-
sion of patent protection.  Recent examples in the current boom in 
such claims suggest the need for caution and restraint on the part of 
both the PTO and courts. For example, Patent No. 5,761,857 was 
recently issued to two architects for their configuration of residen-
tial housing.10  In place of a traditional hallway connecting the sev-
eral rooms and apartments, these patentees applied staircases ex-
ternal to the structure.11 
While architectural design does not readily leap to mind as an 
example of a method of doing business, this patent does raise the 
question of definition.  On what ground should it be excluded from 
the characterization as a business method? Like the business 
method cases decided under the exception prior to State Street 
Bank, the design of a structure could be characterized as the deliv-
ery of a method of organizing space.12 Similarly, Henry Ford’s as-
sembly line method of organizing production might also be charac-
terized as a method of doing the business of automobile 
production.13 Aside from the definitional question inherent in pat-
 
Copyright Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401 (1994); Scott A. Miskimon, Note, 
Divorcing Public Policy from Economic Reality: The Fourth Circuit’s Copyright Misuse 
Doctrine in Lasercomb America Inc. v. Reynolds, 69 N.C.L. REV. 1672 (1991); Note, 
Clarifying the Copyright Misuse Defense: The Role of Antitrust Standards and First 
Amendment Values, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1991); but see, Mark A. Lemley, Comment, 
The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1599 (1990). 
10. See Teresa Riordan, Architects Debate Concepts Behind Housing Design, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 1999, at C11. 
11. Id. 
12. See Loew’s Drive-In Theaters, Inc. v. Park-In Theaters, Inc., 174 F.2d 547 (1st 
Cir. 1949). 
13. JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT CHANGED THE WORLD (1990) 
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enting business methods, this patent shares with patent claims to 
methods of retailing and distributing goods and services, the prob-
lem of locating the prior art.  Like many commercial practices, 
some architectural features have their roots in antiquity—in the 
Great Pyramids, the Roman Aqueducts, and the Parthenon—for 
example. Doubtless, it was this and related issues of the scope of 
patent protection that led a trade association involved with archi-
tects to the reaction described in the newspaper account of this pat-
ent, which states, “These patents (sic) have raised concerns among 
builders and architects.  The National Association of Home Build-
ers, for example, has established a task force to address the ques-
tion of architectural patents.”14  Patent 857 underscores also the 
potential for over-inclusive patent protection.15 
Comparison with the Copyright Act illustrates this point for, in 
addition to patent protection, architectural designs may be pro-
tected by copyright.  Unlike the patent statute, the Copyright Act 
expressly limits the scope of copyright protection of architectural 
works to the creative elements that meet the copyright standard of 
“originality.”16  Accordingly, the Copyright Act limits the scope of 
protection of architectural works to “overall form as well as the ar-
rangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design, 
but does not include individual standard features.”17  It is likely 
that the task force convened by the National Association of Home-
builders will express their concern over the use of standard fea-
tures. 
Another recent patent, No. 5,926,796, which most persons 
would consider to describe a business method, poses kindred ques-
tions.18 This latter patent has been issued for a computerized 
 
(recounting improvements in assembly line production of automobiles made in Japan). 
14. See Riordan, supra note 10 at C11. 
15. See id. 
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1994) (emphasis added); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (stating the Constitutional basis of the originality re-
quirement). 
17. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (emphasis added); For a discussion of the relative flexi-
bility of copyright protection in contrast to patent protection, see Richard H. Stern, 
Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of Doing Busi-
ness, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105 (1999). 
18. Sabra Chartrand, An Internet Entrepreneur Finds a Way for Newsstand Dealers 
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method of subscribing to a magazine at a retail outlet.19  Instead of 
directly dealing with a magazine publisher by mail to obtain the 
lower subscription price, the magazine buyer-subscriber ap-
proaches a retail vendor who contacts the publisher electronically 
and arranges for the lower subscription price.20  This method en-
ables the buyer immediately to obtain the lower subscription price 
on a single-issue purchase at the point of the retail sale and gives 
the retail vendor a fee for facilitating the transaction.  Each of these 
patents pose basic issues of patent law, such as identifying the 
prior art and specifying the non-obvious advance entitled to protec-
tion. 
In this patent, finding the non-obvious, inventive step becomes 
troublesome. The patent, as described in the news article, comes 
within the State Street Bank rubric if the vendor’s communications 
with publishers is accomplished by means of a computer pro-
gram.21  Suppose, however, it involves a telephone call.  Does the 
analysis of State Street Bank grant patent protection to a telephone 
call, which achieves a useful result?  In both circumstances, patents 
are thrust into a vibrant, established process of competitive com-
mercial rivalry, a process that has traditionally been governed by 
emulation and by customary practices.22  An added perverse result 
of this intrusion is the incentive for some entrepreneurs to become 
collectors of patent royalties, rather than to continue as active par-
 




22. One economist has characterized this process of close emulation of existing 
products and services in manufacturing and marketing, as follows: 
The general rule for any new manufacturer coming into an industry is to make 
your products as like the existing products as you can. . . .  It explains why all 
automobiles are so much alike. . . .  It explains the importance of brand names 
in commercial. . . life, for the best way of making a product as much like other 
products as possible. . .is to make it physically similar to the others but to call it 
something different and to try to build up by advertising a preference in the 
mind of the buyer for the name of the product. 
KENNETH BOULDING, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 601 (1941). For a formal development of the 
economic theory of this process, entitled product differentiation, see Edward H. Cham-
berlin, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, ch. 1 (5th ed.) (1946); Willard F. 
Mueller, Sources of Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called ‘Product Differentiation,’ 
18 AMER. U. L. REV. 1 (1968). 
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ticipants in the marketplace.23  If the boom in business method pat-
ents continues at its accelerating pace, the so-called superhighway 
of electronic commerce could be partially converted into a toll 
road.   
I.  SKETCHING AN ECONOMIC MODEL 
A historical review of the patent system discloses the dual at-
tributes of the patent that continue to dominate its economic analy-
sis.24  From its early uses, the patent offered both an incentive and 
a reward for creative activity, as well as serving as a grant of some 
power (monopoly) in the marketplace.25  Although the origin of 
patents can be traced to a Fifteenth Century Act of the Venetian 
Senate, they attained wide use in England early in the Seventeenth 
Century during the reign of James I.26  There, the patent served 
frequently as a grant to a favored courtier, rather than as a royal 
recognition of creative activity.27  Patents were granted to court 
favorites for a wide variety of activities including among others, 
the exclusive proprietary rights to manufacture playing cards as 
well as the exclusive rights to the running of an alehouse.28  
Parliament responded to the perceived abuses of these grants with 
the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies, which restricted the  
23. The newspaper article describing the architectural patent goes on to recite that 
the patentees had licensed their patent to developers and were collecting royalties. This 
reported fact suggests that these architects no longer derive their total revenue from the 
practice of architecture, but are now, in part, functioning as licensors of their patents. 
This news article further states: “[The Patentee] said his firm had licensed the patents to 
major developers in six states, and had settled out of court with companies he and his 
partner have charged with infringing. . .’When we believe someone has infringed on our 
patents, we will take due course,’ he said.” Riordan, supra note 10. 
The news article on the magazine subscription patent states that the patentee had obtained 
a dozen business method patents for such activities, among others, as figuring foreign 
exchange insurance premiums, post-paid travelers checks, and a method of playing lotter-
ies. The article further recites that the principal patentee is known best for a patent on 
buying airline tickets on the internet. The news story states: “[The patent recites] a ‘re-
verse auction’ technique that enables consumers to name their own price for airline tick-
ets—which airlines can choose to accept or not.. . .[This patent grants]. . . .exclusive 
rights to that particular form of electronic sales.” Chartrand, supra note 18 at C8. 
24. Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J. 




28. ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW & POLICY 153 (2d. ed. 1997). 
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ment of the Statute of Monopolies, which restricted the duration of 
the privilege, while noting also the injury to competition inherent 
in the exercise of patent rights.29  Subsequent economic analysis of 
patents continues to address these two attributes of the patent: the 
incentive/reward for creative activity and the impediment to com-
petition.30 
Patent grants burgeoned in the years following the Industrial 
Revolution.  By the mid-Twentieth Century the patent as a factor 
in industrial expansion had become the subject of study by econo-
mists.31  A cursory review of the extensive economic literature on 
the theory and function of patents provides a useful introduction to 
the present inquiry.  This literature, some of which is devoted to 
detailed studies of specific patents as practiced in given industries, 
provides a reference point from which patent protection for busi-
ness methods can be assessed.  In contemporary economic analy-
sis, patents are characterized as an ancillary factor in the develop-
ment of technology; it is the application of technology that is 
deemed the primary factor in economic growth.32 
The middle of the Twentieth Century marks the beginning of 
the intensive study of the patent as a factor inducing the research 
 
29. Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam. 1, ch.3, § 5 (1623) (Eng.). Sec. 5 provided in 
part, that the use of the patent “be not contrary to law, nor mischievous to the State, by 
raising the price of commodities. . .or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient. . .” Id. The 
abuses leading to the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies have been described as fol-
lows: “unscrupulous courtiers persuaded. . .[the Crown] to give them monopolistic rights 
even over industries already established. The gravest kinds of abuses immediately 
arose. . . .  The persons securing the monopoly of salt at once raised the price from 16 
pence to 14 shillings.” Franklin D. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business 
Competition, 35 YALE L.J. 905, 930 (1926). 
30. Patents, which give the inventor of a new product an exclusive right to sell it, 
have both desirable and undesirable effects.  The chief benefit is that the possibility of 
monopoly profits encourages more inventive activity.  The chief disadvantage is that the 
new product may be sold at high (monopoly) prices.  See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY 
M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 653 (1990). 
31. FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY NO. 15, 
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY (1958); WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTIONS, 
GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, ch. 1 
(1969); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and the Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265 (1977); FREDRIC M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH: SCHUMPETERIAN 
PERSPECTIVES (1984). 
32. RICHARD R. NELSON, THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1996). 
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and development that produces new technology. Prior to the semi-
nal work of Robert Solow, economists viewed economic expansion 
as a function of efficiencies resulting from the proportion of capital 
to labor and from the division of the tasks assigned to workers. 
Thus, Adam Smith described the rise in the output of pins as a 
function of increased mechanization and the division of labor.33 
Solow found that technology also makes a material contribution to 
increased output.34 In measuring the rise in non-farm output be-
tween 1909 and 1949, Solow showed that increased capital inten-
sity alone did not fully account for the measured growth in out-
put.35  Denison, a subsequent investigator, determined that some of 
the gain in output per worker for the period 1929-1982 was attrib-
utable to capital intensity, increased work force education, and to 
the realization of scale economies.36 However, he also noted that a 
significant part of the observed increase was attributable to scien-
tific and technological advances.37 
Prior to these empirical studies some economists had posed a 
related question as a theoretical proposition. These writers, conced-
ing the importance of technology to economic growth, theorized 
about the necessary industrial conditions for inducing entrepre-
neurs to undertake the costs of research and development. Joseph 
Schumpeter, a prominent theorist, concluded that a certain amount 
of monopoly power in the marketplace, including patent protec-
tion, was required to assure society of the benefits of technological 
innovation.38 Subsequent empirical studies of various industries 
 
33. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS, Book 1, ch. 1 (1776). 
34. Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 
39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957). 
35. Id. 
36. EDWARD F. DENISON, TRENDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH 1929-1982 (1985) 
37. Id. 
38. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 106-108 
(1942); Schumpeter’s thesis has been summarized as follows: 
[T]he competitive process itself consisted of a series of disequilibria, caused by 
innovations by dominant firms. Each innovation. . . was undertaken precisely in 
the expectation that. . . [the innovation] would yield monopoly profits to the in-
novating firm. Prospects for monopoly profits induced innovation. . . .  This in-
novation-monopoly-disequilibrium sequence.. . . generated benefits of technical 
progress far over-shadowing any niceties of marginal misallocation caused as 
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identified the importance of research and development as the stra-
tegic factor in nurturing and advancing technology.39  This histori-
cal review of specific technological advances showed, for example, 
that Watts’ development of the steam engine was attributable to the 
prior experimentation by the firm of Boulton & Watt. Similarly, it 
was noted that the laboratories of Thomas Edison and Alexander 
Graham Bell had contributed materially to the final invention by 
the development of models and the testing of various compo-
nents.40 
As to the role of the patent within this process of technological 
innovation, economic analysis identifies the patent as an ancillary, 
but necessary factor.  From this perspective, the patent provides an 
incentive for the outlay of the time and the technical skill (the re-
search and development expenses) central to the development of 
new technology.41  The incentive feature of the patent followed 
from its legal authority to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling the patented method or apparatus until the investment (plus 
a reasonable rate of return) in research and development had been 
recouped through the royalty commanded by the patent. 
This basic theoretical model explaining the function of patent 
protection is linked to the standard micro-economic assumption 
that economic actors are rational in pursuit of maximizing their in-
terests.42  Accordingly, the basic theoretical model addressing the 
function of patents states that the patent serves as an incentive to 
induce the requisite sunken costs, i.e. the initial outlay of money 
and effort in the face of an uncertain outcome.43  Under this as-
 
market power flickered on and off. . . . 
WILLIAM G. SHEPHARD, MARKET POWER & ECONOMIC WELFARE, 16-17 (1970). 
39. The pioneering work is SCHERER, supra note 31. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (4th ed. 1992) (the maxi-
mizing principle is a fundamental principle of economics). 
43. WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTIONS, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL 
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, ch. 1 (1969); Edmund Kitch, The Nature and 
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); FRITZ MACHLUP, AN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, STUDY NO. 15, SENATE COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY (1958); Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and 
Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 1 (1991). 
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sumption of rational economic behavior, the research and devel-
opment outlays would not be made, absent some reasonable pro-
tection against the immediate copying of a new process or appara-
tus by a competitor.44  This basic model also posits that the grant of 
patent protection and the ability of the patentee to exclude others 
from making, using, or selling the patented subject matter provides 
the requisite incentive for the outlay of the research and develop-
ment costs.45  The patent’s exclusionary rights afford the patentee 
the power to appropriate the value of the patented subject matter 
by commanding a royalty for its use.  The prospect of such quasi-
rents, i.e. payments to a factor of production in excess of the 
amount required to elicit a supply of that factor, offers an incentive 
to engage in the creative conduct leading to the invention. 
There is, however, a qualification to this characterization of the 
role of patents.  Economic analysis, without reference to patents, 
posits that competition among market actors is the preferred norm 
for efficient allocation of resources.46  Thus, the exclusionary 
power of the patent, to which the phrase, “patent monopoly,” is 
sometimes attached, is also incorporated into the economic analy-
sis.47  Around this “monopoly” function of the patent economists 
have constructed the familiar tradeoff model in which the incentive 
effect of this monopoly grant is to be balanced against the dead-
weight loss attributed to the negative impact of monopoly on con-
sumer welfare.48 
In applying this analysis, it is understood that an aggregate ap-
proach is taken.  This analysis states a general tendency, valid for 
economic actors as a group; this approach does not descend to the 
level of the incentive needed to induce any given individual to un-
 
44. Richard C. Levin, et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research 
and Development, BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY, 783 (1987). 
45. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994). 
46. DONALD DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW, ch. 2 (1959); Guido 
Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 
(1991)(presenting a critical exposition of the theory of optimum efficiency). 
47. See CARLTON & PERLOFF supra note 30. 
48. Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 175 (1986); F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 400-4 (1970); WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, MARKET POWER 
AND ECONOMIC WELFARE, 29 (1970). 
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dertake research in any one particular product, process, or appara-
tus or to take account of the risk sensitivity of individual entrepre-
neurs or investigators.  A leading economic scholar of the patent 
system has described the incentive function of the patent system, 
stating that “the patent system is a crude and imperfect instrument. 
Because of diverse real-world complications, the patent protection 
given an innovator may be too little, too much, or the wrong 
kind.”49 
Attempts to address some of the “real world complications” 
have brought refinements to the model.50  Edmund Kitch has iden-
tified the distinction between the reward function and the prospect 
function of patents.51  He stressed the importance of the basic eco-
nomic incentive model, noting its importance in the pre-invention 
environment.52  In addition, he also urged that broad scope be 
given to patents, by both the PTO and courts, in order to nurture 
post-invention decision-making for the development and exploita-
tion of new processes and devices.53  In his view, a new process or 
apparatus would more likely be commercialized by the inventor 
who had broad patent protection by insulating such patentee from 
competitive rivalry during the early stages of the commercial de-
velopment of new technology.54  Broadest scope should be af-
forded “pioneer patents”—those patents which represented impor-
tant advances and offered the greatest prospect of generating 
significant ancillary technology.55  This analysis thus provides a 
theoretical economic rationale to support patents as a material in-
centive to creative activity.56  For this analysis to support the ex-
tension of patent protection to methods of doing business would 
require some showing of material innovation in business meth-
ods—a difficult challenge in light of the rapid emulation of coffee 
 
49. F. M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE, 624 (3d. ed. 1990). 
50. See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 





55. Kitch, supra note 50 
56. Id. 
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bars, fast food outlets, internet commerce transactions, and web 
page communication, among others. 
However, before applying this model to patents on business 
methods, it is appropriate to take account of the empiri-
cal/historical studies of industries in which patents have played a 
material role.  The empirical work provides a link between the ex-
pectations posited by the theory and the observed function of the 
patent in industries in which growth is attributable to patented ap-
paratus, processes, and methods.  These industry studies provide a 
backdrop of experience with both pre-and post-invention environ-
ments with which to consider the likely impact on competition of 
the widespread patenting of business methods.  These histori-
cal/empirical studies have the further benefit of directing attention 
to the inventive process, as well as to subsequent commercializa-
tion of new technology.  It is worth noting at this juncture, that the 
State Street Bank decision omits any concern with the inventive 
step in the business method to which it granted protection.  It was 
sufficient for the Federal Circuit to find statutory subject matter in 
the computer program that had produced “a useful, concrete, and 
tangible result.”57 
A material contribution of this empirical work is its emphasis 
on the nature of the creative process.  One such study probed the 
source of seventy important inventions asking whether the creative 
activity occurred in an industrial laboratory or by individual effort 
undertaken on private premises.58  This study showed that only 
twenty-four inventions were the product of an industrial laboratory 
within a firm.59  More than half of the seventy inventions were the 
product of an individual working either in an academic institution 
or on her own.60  The substantial empirical/historical literature of 
the role played by patents in fostering new technology has recently 
been reviewed by Merges and Nelson.61  They focus the empiri-
 
57. State Street Bank,149 F.3d at 1374 (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 
(Fed. Cir. 1994)) (emphasis added). 
58. JOHN JEWKES ET AL., THE SOURCES OF INVENTION, 321 (2d. ed. 1969). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Robert  P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990). 
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cal/historical literature on the basic tradeoff question, i.e. whether 
greater patent protection increases inventive effort or whether the 
net result of broader patent protection is greater deadweight loss.62 
These authors assume that it is the scope of protection afforded a 
patent that is central to analyzing its impact.63  Their preference for 
striking a socially-desirable tradeoff between the desired incentive 
role of the patent and the negative deadweight loss engendered by 
its monopolistic attributes is to adjust the scope of patent protec-
tion.64  Merges and Nelson reviewed the evidence of technological 
development in several selected industries from this perspective.65 
In testing the theoretical premise that granting broad protection 
to the “pioneer” patentee in a cumulative technology industry ac-
celerates technology, these authors examined technological ad-
vancement in electric lighting, automobiles, airplanes, radio, and 
semiconductors and computers.66  In electric lighting, they found 
that Edison’s dominant patent on the carbon filament as a light 
source did not result in rapid commercial development.67  They 
conclude that “the validation of Edison’s broad patent slowed the 
pace of improvements considerably.”68  Moreover, they point out 
that the acquisition of Edison’s patent enabled General Electric to 
obtain injunctions shutting down competitors, thereby increasing 
its market share from 40 to 75 percent.69  General Electric was then 
able to limit entry into the industry while making just minimal im-
provements in the product.70  They contrast the rate of technologi-
cal improvement in lamps with the more rapid rate of development 
in other sectors of the electric industry, such as power generation 
and arc-lighting.71  In these sectors they found a causal relation be-
 
62. In some circumstances, an increase of deadweight loss may result in higher so-
cial welfare as when a patented apparatus becomes a substitute for a most costly input. 
See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 
247, 250 (1994). 
63. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 61, at 840. 
64. See id. at 839-40. 
65. See id. at 884-905. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. at 886. 
68. See id. 
69. See id. at 885. 
70. See id. at 885-86. 
71. See id. at 887-88. 
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tween the absence of broad patent protection and the rapid entry of 
competing firms and accelerated product improvement.72 
A similar pattern is noted in the automobile and airplane indus-
tries which were marked by dominant patents at their inception.73  
The Selden patent on the light-weight internal combustion engine 
and the Wright patent on the steering and stabilization system of 
aircraft contained broadly drawn claims covering a variety of em-
bodiments.74  Merges and Nelson note that the record of the auto-
mobile industry shows that Selden did not seek to commercialize 
the patent.75  He sought instead to license any user who was will-
ing to acknowledge the patent and to pay royalties.76  The Wrights, 
however, refused to license their patent.77  Merges and Nelson note 
that these industries did not conform to the theoretical prediction 
that the dominant patentee would consider the broad patent protec-
tion as an incentive to develop the subject matter.78 The automo-
bile industry developed through others who paid royalties to Sel-
den’s licensing entity.79  Rather than become a 
developer/manufacturer, Selden functioned as a collector of royal-
ties.80  The Wrights, however, did undertake to produce airplanes 
and to improve their design, but they refused to license others 
whose design ideas were at odds with theirs.81  On the basis of 
their study of these industries, Merges and Nelson doubt the effi-
cacy of broad patent protection as a means of achieving techno-
logical progress.82 As they concluded: 
There is good reason to believe that the Wright patent sig-
nificantly held back the pace of aircraft development in the 
United States . . . .  The aircraft case is similar to that of 
 
72. See id. at 887. 
73. See id. at 888-89. 
74. See id. at 888-91. 
75. See id. at 888-89; see also, 44 WILLIAM GREENLEAF, MONOPOLY ON WHEELS; 
HENRY FORD AND THE SELDEN AUTOMOBILE PATENT (1961). 
76. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 61, at 889. 
77. See id. 
78. See id. at 889-91. 
79. See id. at 889-90. 
80. See id. at 889. 
81. See id. at 890. 
82. See id. at 891. 
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automobiles in that the problems caused by the initial pio-
neering patent were compounded as improvements and 
complementary patents, owned by different companies, 
came into existence.  The situation was so serious that at 
the insistence of the Secretary of the Navy, during World 
War I, an arrangement was worked out to enable automo-
bile cross licensing. This arrangement. . .turned out to be a 
durable institution.  By the end of World War I there were 
so many patents on different aircraft features that a com-
pany had to negotiate a large number of licenses to produce 
a state-of-the-art plane.83 
In contrast, these authors cite the radio industry as an example 
of the potential for gridlock in the development of a technology 
when several broad patents exist on complementary components.84 
The conflict and diverting litigation was ultimately resolved by the 
formation of a single entity, the Radio Corporation of America 
(RCA), which took in the owners of all of the potentially blocking 
patents as major shareholders in the corporation.85  Comparing the 
development of technology in autos and airplanes with the experi-
ence of the radio industry, they conclude that “many early inven-
tors in cumulative technologies often perform overlapping re-
search.  This may lead to blockages unless basic patents are not 
present, or routine licensing and cross licensing is instituted.”86 
The semiconductor and computer industry is then cited as an 
example of an industry in which technology advancement was ac-
celerated by the absence of broad patents on its pioneering tech-
nology.87  The history of this industry shows that the initial transis-
tor patent was held by AT&T, which was barred by an antitrust 
decree from enforcing it.88  Moreover, the two patents on parts of 
the integrated circuit held by Fairchild and by Texas Instruments 
were quickly cross-licensed under the aegis of the Department of 
 
83. See id. at 890-1. 
84. See id. 
85. See id. at 893 
86. Id. 
87. See id. at 893-94. 
88. See id. at 894. 
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Defense, the principle purchaser of this technology at the time.89  
In the semiconductor and related electronic industries, Merges and 
Nelson concluded that  “patents have played only a very minor role 
in the computer industry, and where patents are concerned, cross 
licensing is common.”90 
Based on their review of these and other industries (chemical 
and biotechnology), the authors state their conclusion as to the ef-
fects of broad patent protection as follows: 
Our general conclusion is that multiple and competitive 
sources of invention are socially preferable to a structure 
where there is only one or a few sources. Public policy, in-
cluding patent law, ought to encourage inventive rivalry, 
and not hinder it . . . .  [A] rivalrous structure surely has its 
inefficiencies. But such a structure does tend to generate 
rapid technological progress and seems a better social bet 
than a regime where only one or a few organizations con-
trol the development of a given technology.91 
II.  APPLYING THE MODEL 
The theoretical model adjusted by empirical data illuminates 
the basic policy choices presented by the patent regime. Since the 
theoretical trade-off model frames both the incentive function as 
well as the monopoly element of patents, the first step in assessing 
the policy justification for adding subject matter to section 101 of 
the Patent Act92 is to pose the question: is an incentive required to 
induce this kind of activity—i.e. new methods of doing business? 
This inquiry is linked to a collateral question because the exclu-
sionary rights of section 154(a)(1) enable the patentee to prevent 
immediate access to the protected subject matter by a competitor—
the monopoly element.93  As an incentive, patents grant innovators 
 
89. See id. Anecdotal information is that Texas Instruments made its patents a profit 
center. Some estimates suggest that but for its patent royalties, the company would have 
operated at a loss for several years.  This practice may have achieved an economically 
efficient outcome in that low-cost manufacturers practiced the patents.  
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 908. 
92. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
93. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994). 
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quasi-rents to appropriate the value of their inventions, as well as 
the protection against immediate commercialization of a similar 
process or apparatus by competitors, who may have incurred little 
or no research costs. Accordingly, the collateral incentive question 
is: are there presently cited instances of aggressive rivalrous prac-
tices that are undercutting the incentive to further innovation of 
methods of doing business? At this writing, there is no pending 
legislation seeking protection against such practices.94  Are there, 
however, grounds other than abusive practices or “free-riding” for 
granting patent protection to business methods? 
Again, empirical data on the function of business method pat-
ents is insubstantial, because of the brief period in which business 
methods have enjoyed patent protection. There is an additional 
limitation in applying these empirical studies to business method 
patents. The patents in the industries described above have been 
associated with the production side of economic activity. Innova-
tion in products and processes there involved tangible assets mov-
ing in market transactions. The dollar value of these products can 
be identified and measured.95  The business practices which re-
ceived protection in the State Street Bank decision involve the ser-
vice and distribution side of economic activity.96 Significantly, 
there seem to be no studies of distribution and service industries as 
an element in economic growth beyond the calculation of their 
contribution in the national income accounts.97  In the absence of 
data showing a need to spur innovation in business methods, it is 
equally plausible that the spur of competition and the long tradition 
of competition by emulation have been sufficient to provide an 
adequate level of innovation in methods of doing business.98 
 
94. Perceived abusive competitive practices frequently are reflected in legislation. 
The House of Representatives for the last three sessions has responded to requests for 
database protection. See H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. § 273 (1999).  Similarly, Congress has 
enacted design protection for vessel hulls to reverse the denial by the Supreme Court of 
state law protection of such designs in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 
489 U.S. 141 (1989). See Digital Millenium Copyright Act, P.L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(codified at 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1332) (1998). 
95. See J. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS 660-66 (1993) 
96. See 149 F.3d at 1370-72. 
97. See STIGLITZ, supra note 95 (noting the contribution of service providers to em-
ployee compensation, profits, rents, interest, and taxes). 
98. See id. 
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There is further reason to avoid reliance on economic theory as 
a basis for the expansive grant of patents on methods of doing 
business. Recent economic writing, as well as the literature of law 
and economics invites caution.99  Innovation predicted as rational 
economic behavior as a matter of abstract theory may not occur. 
Economic opportunities posited by theory may not always be em-
braced because other strategies may dominate.100  In such instances 
technology may be impeded rather than accelerated.101  The basic 
premise of economic rationality itself, is currently under review 
among economists and law and economics scholars. An emerging 
field of “behavioral economics” calls into question the universal 
validity of the traditional maximizing assumption by drawing on 
insights from studies in cognitive psychology.102  Such studies 
draw on the basic maximizing assumption, but modify it by the in-
sights and experiments of psychologists. What emerges from this 
work is the conception of economic actors making choices from 
preferences shaped by past experience as well as by differential 
risk and loss assessments. For example, consumers’ conception of 
the “unfairness” of a price may require a profit-maximizing mo-
nopolist to price below the optimum price predicted by traditional 
 
99. See Thomas G. Krattenmacher & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: 
Raising Rivals Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986)(describing 
strategic behavior); William J. Baumol & Janusz Ordover, Uses of Antitrust To Subvert 
Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247 (1985). 
100. See Krattenmacher, supra note 99. 
101. Id. 
102. Albert O. Hirschman, Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a 
Quasi-Vanishing Act, 13 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE, 385 (1965)(attitudes toward 
development do not conform to maximizing assumption); George A. Akerlof & William 
T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 
307 (1982)(identifying transactions in which economic actors respond differentially to the 
same data based on cognitive differences); Shira Lewin, Economics and Psychology: 
Lessons for Our Own Day from the Early Twentieth Century, 34 J. ECON. LIT. 1293 
(1996)(recounting the historical tension between mainstream economists’ reliance on ra-
tional choice and attempts to infuse economic theory with behavioral perspectives); see 
also, TERENCE W. HUTCHISON, THE SIGNIFICANCE AND BASIC POSTULATES OF ECONOMIC 
THEORY, 41 (1938)(urging logical positivism as the approach to behavioral assumptions 
in economics); Kelvin J. Lancaster, A New Approach To Consumer Theory, 74 J. POL. 
ECON. 132 (1966). But see, Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and  Economic Theory, 
70 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1962)(defending traditional analysis). 
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theory.103  Overall, this literature describes human decision-making 
as being prone to non-rational, yet systematic tendencies.104 
Although behavioral economics is still in its developmental 
stage, there is sufficient credible work to suggest that behavior 
other than universal maximizing can be incorporated into eco-
nomic models. The significance of behavioral economics for pre-
sent purposes is that it casts doubt on the conclusion that broad pat-
ent protection for new subject matter can be justified solely on the 
micro-economic model that such protection is required to induce 
innovation. Limited reliance by judges and other decision-makers 
on unqualified postulates of rational economic behavior is also 
suggested by the recent work of a group of economic theorists 
whose research suggests empirical testing of theoretical postulates. 
A leading economic theorist has described that “theory is being 
forced to be much more specific. The whole intention of empirical 
economics is to force theory down to earth.”105 
These developments in economic analysis suggest that absent 
supporting empirical data, the need for patent protection of busi-
ness methods should be considered an unsettled question because 
the State Street Bank opinion does not provide an analytical plat-
form for business method patents.  Rather, the opinion rests on the 
proposition that the Patent Act authorizes patents, including busi-
 
103. Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitle-
ments in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1986). 
104. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, in THE 
RATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 203 (Kenneth J. Arrow, Enrico Co-
lombatto, Mark Perlman & Christian Schmidt eds., 1996); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sun-
stein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach To Law And Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471 (1998); but see, Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, 
And The Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551 (1998); Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness 
Into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1292 (1993); Matthew 
Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36  J. ECON. LIT. 11 (1998). See also, Jon D. Hanson 
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behaviorism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipula-
tion, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999). 
105. George A. Akerlof, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at C1. The same article cites 
empirical testing of the theoretical premise that a rise in the minimum wage will cause a 
decline in the demand for minimum wage workers. A comparative survey of the fast-food 
markets in New Jersey and Pennsylvania showed that an increase in the minimum wage 
in New Jersey had no effect on the number of minimum wage workers employed. Id. at 
C10. 
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ness method patents.106  The opinion does not address the issue of 
implementing this perspective on a case by case application of the 
Patent Act. The mischief of this decision is its failure to recognize 
any difference between laboratory and experimentally-generated 
methods and processes and methods derived from the competitive 
rivalry of the marketplace, an arena dominated by emulation and 
narrowed to conformity by regulatory statutes and regulations. Ac-
cordingly, the precedential value of this decision should be as-
sessed as neither barring nor necessarily advancing business 
method patents. Such a restrictive interpretation is supported by the 
opinion itself. Setting aside the improvident strictures against the 
prior rule, Judge Rich wrote that, “Since the 1952 Patent Act, busi-
ness methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same 
legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process 
or method.”107 
Accordingly, the burden of establishing patent protection for a 
business method should remain on the claimant to present credible 
supporting data to establish eligibility for patent protection. A dis-
tinct element of a claimant’s burden for the grant of a business 
method should be the identification of the inventive contribution. 
Identification of the prior art is also required. Arguments for patent 
protection grounded on theoretical models as needed incentives to 
innovation should be dismissed. Granting relief based solely on a 
traditional economic model has recently been rejected by the Su-
preme Court in a non-patent case.108  The same approach should be 
taken by the PTO examiners and by judges in considering claims 
of patent protection for methods of doing business. Recent analysis 
of the decision to patent, as well as the decision to risk infringe-
ment, portray a world far more complex than that of the traditional 
maximizing model.109  Courts should give weight to the fact that 
business methods are not derived from laboratory research and ex-
perimentation, but evolve and are implemented in an environment 
of rivalry and emulation. The interactive responses that shape 
 
106. See id. 
107. 149 F.3d at 1375. 
108. Id. (rejecting Kodak’s argument for a presumption of legality based on a theo-
retical model and requiring a presentation of market data). 
109. See infra notes 113-114. 
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business methods are largely shaped by customary practices. Busi-
ness methods are devised as much by current fads in customer ap-
peal as by experimentation and innovation, e.g. the welter of goods 
and services tumbling daily from the Internet. 
There is also a constraining element in the emulation of busi-
ness methods. Product groups and services tend to cluster in a 
sameness of near-similarity to their potential customers. A 
seller/producer who moves in advance of the revealed preferences 
of consumers’ risks a loss of customers and a resulting decline in 
revenue. Intruding patent protection into such an emulating, com-
petitive market system, absent a clear showing of useful innovative 
advances, serves only to disrupt. In such circumstances, patent pro-
tection offers entrepreneurs the alternative of entirely or partially 
withdrawing from participation as market actors in favor of devot-
ing their energies to licensing and litigating patent infringement 
cases. The consequence of such conduct may be to increase trans-
actions costs, which may, because of the monopoly element of pat-
ents, result in price increases and a negative impact on consumer 
welfare. 
Litigation costs are a significant factor in patent protection.110  
Studies have identified litigation costs as a material element in the 
management of patent rights.111  For example, if preliminary in-
junctions are readily available in infringement cases involving 
business method patents, an incentive is provided for recourse to 
litigation, sometimes at modest cost, as a means to impede a com-
petitor.112  Accordingly, courts should be restrictive in granting 
preliminary injunctions in business method patent cases.113  Mod-
 
110. Josh Lerner, Patenting In The Shadow Of Competitors, 38 J.L. & ECON. 463 
(1995). 
111. See id. 
112. See id. 
113. One study shows that the Federal Circuit has increased the grant of preliminary 
injunctions since its inception, William A. Morrison, Note, The Impact of the Creation of 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on the Availability of Preliminary Injunctive 
Relief Against Patent Infringement, 23 IND. L. REV. 169 (1990); see e.g., Systemation, Inc. 
v. Engel Indus. Inc., 1999 WL 129640 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 10, 1999) (unpublished table deci-
sion); PPG Industries v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351 (Fed Cir. 1998). See also, 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
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est use of injunctive relief has the further advantage of preserving 
the incentive feature of the patent, without concurrently maintain-
ing or enhancing its “monopoly” potential.114 
Restraint in the issuance of business method patents is also 
warranted on the part of the Patent Office.  Initially, the grant of 
business method patents by the PTO should be founded on a strict 
application of the Patent Act itself. Although the opinion in State 
Street Bank stresses the single issue of rejecting a business method 
exception in secrion 101,115  the Patent Act requires more.116 Now 
that the business method exemption has been effectively removed 
from patent jurisprudence, decision-makers face the basic frame-
work of the Act, without much guidance from the opinion in State 
Street Bank.  Evolving a workable patent regime for the protection 
for business methods is a substantially larger undertaking than this 
opinion implies. 
Consider the ready availability of preliminary injunctions as 
well as the application of the State Street Bank opinion in the fol-
lowing hypothetical situations. Recall that Dell Computer avoids 
retail distribution costs by delivering to the consumer direct-
ordered, custom-built computers. To fill the consumer’s order Dell 
uses a variation of Henry Ford’s assembly line method of manufac-
ture. Instead of a moving assembly line, Dell’s employees form a 
cell of two or three workers who assemble the entire final product 
to the consumer’s specifications in a fixed factory location. Gate-
way, a competing seller of computers, observing the success of 
Dell’s direct-order method and its resulting lower selling prices, 
seeks a market niche by emulating Dell’s direct-sale, customized 
manufacturing. Suppose then that Gateway adds a chain of retail 
facilities where consumers may browse, inspect, and try many dif-
ferent computers prior to placing a direct order for the one se-
lected. Now Circuit City, a large, national electronics-retailing 
competitor, comes into the same relevant market. Circuit City 
management, responding to a loss of computer sales to its competi-
 
114. Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Re-
ducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive 
Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999). 
115. 149 F.3d at 1375. 
116. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
RASKINDFMT.DOC 9/29/2006  3:27 PM 
84 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 10:61 
tors, modifies its traditional showroom, point of sale retail method. 
Circuit City managers emulate the sales methods of their competi-
tors with the following modification. In addition to offering on-site 
inspection and expert salesperson assistance in demonstrating the 
use of many brands of computers, Circuit City adopts Gateway’s 
direct-order method by adding a kiosk on its premises from which 
a direct order can be placed to either Dell or to Gateway from its 
toll-free telephone line. Circuit City then works out a “finder’s fee” 
schedule with Dell and Gateway whereby Circuit City obtains a 
stated percentage of the value of each order placed from its prem-
ises. 
Assume Dell, Gateway, and Circuit City all seek to patent their 
distribution method. What is the prior art—Henry Ford’s assembly 
line, Sears Roebuck’s early mail order catalog, L.L. Bean’s succes-
sor catalog, Victoria’s Secret’s Web Page, or Amazon.com’s Inter-
net book distribution? This is an essential inquiry, one which was 
not addressed in the State Street Bank opinion, although the opin-
ion recited that “business methods have been and should have been 
subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied 
to any other process or method.”117  The search for prior art be-
comes complex when it is noted that business methods predated 
the origin of the patent regime and the United States Constitutional 
basis for them.118  Is the bill of exchange of the Law Merchant a 
precursor of the contemporary financial instrument known as a de-
rivative?  Moreover, the economic model sketched above under-
scored the need to assess the efficacy of patents by a study of the 
role of patents in development of specific industries.119  Given the 
absence of protection for business methods prior to the State Street 
 
117. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1375.  In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 
1, 33 (1966), the court noted the centrality of  the prior art inquiry. The prior art of busi-
ness methods has a long historical trail. Business transactions predate the founding of the 
patent regime. The first barter transaction involved a method of doing business. Many 
business methods are ingrained in social customs. Banking is an example in which cus-
tom, manifold government regulations, and the spur of competition have produced styl-
ized transactions. Finding the prior art in the practice of credit transactions would pose 
daunting definitional and investigative task. 
118. THEODORE F.P. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, ch. 5 
(5th ed. 1956) (tracing the development of maritime and mercantile law from customary 
practices). 
119. See id. 
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Bank decision, there presently exist no industry studies of them. 
Indeed, to plan an industry study of current patent protection of 
business methods poses issues of circularity. To assess the causal 
link between patent protection and the growth of a business prac-
tice, it would be necessary to distinguish between the impetus 
given the practice by the spur of competition and that attributable 
to patent protection. For example, is the development of financial 
instruments suited to inclusion in a Roth IRA attributable to the 
competition inspired by this tax-saving feature of the Internal 
Revenue Code, or to the creativity of financial intermediaries, or 
partially to each? 
Suppose Dell sues Circuit City for infringement of its business 
method patent and the defendant relied on section 273 of H.R. 
1907, recently passed by the House.120 This provision authorizes a 
defense of use based on an earlier invention.121 Section 273 (a)(3) 
provides that the phrase “use of a method in the United States,” in-
cludes a  “method of doing or conducting business.”122 How would 
a court rule and make findings based on a definition of Dell’s 
method of conducting business?123 
Also absent from the State Street Bank opinion is guidance in 
identifying the non-obvious advance over the prior art—the inven-
tion.  Assume that Dell, Gateway, and Circuit City each employ a 
different software designer to execute their business method. As-
suming that there are material differences in the design of each 
software program does each computer program of each competitor 
warrant patent protection? Suppose each program was independ-
ently created and each program manages the costs of inventory, 
manufacturing, and distribution, as well as computing a final retail 
price.  If so, what is the scope of each patent? Business methods in 
substantial part are a product of market interaction among competi-
 
120. H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. § 273 (1999). 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Recently, Congress has underscored the importance of determining the inven-
tion in business patent methods.  On August 4, 1999, the House of Representatives 
passed H.R. 1907, The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, in which § 273(a)(3) 
defines “method” for purposes of the defense to infringement based on earlier invention, 
to include “a method of doing or conducting business.” 58 (BNA) PAT., TRADEMARK, & 
COPYRIGHT J. 413 (Aug. 5, 1999). 
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tors. As the above example illustrates, commercial rivalry itself is a 
material factor in changing business methods. Which patent doc-
trine can serve to draw the line between those changes in business 
methods attributable to a competitor and those that are sufficiently 
innovative and non-obvious to warrant patent protection under 
State Street Bank?  Because business methods have their origin in 
the first barter transaction in antiquity and have evolved by cus-
tom, to grant them protection now within the framework of the 
Patent Act is troublesome. To do so requires distinguishing be-
tween methods derived from customary practice from those suffi-
ciently novel and original to warrant patent protection. In the cur-
rent computer-dominated market environment it may even be 
difficult properly to identify the innovation.  The State Street Bank 
case is illustrative of the nature of this task.124 
On the fundamental issue of identifying the invention, the opin-
ion offers no guidance.  Indeed it is difficult to distill the innova-
tion from the facts as recited in the State Street Bank opinion.125  
Boes, the inventor, was a software designer engaged to write a 
program executing the calculations required by the Regulations to 
the Internal Revenue Code.126  Those Regulations set out in great 
detail the basic transactional and conceptual structure for Boes’ 
software program.127  Necessarily, his program follows this struc-
ture. The regulations provide the conceptual principles and give 
examples of partnership transactions having “substantial economic 
effect”128—the touchstone of allowable allocation of income items, 
gains, losses, deductions, and credits to partner’s capital ac-
counts.129  It might appear from the length and the complexity of 
these regulations that they represent original and innovative expo-
sition of a difficult concept in the federal income taxation of part-
 
124. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373. 
125. Id. at 1370-2. 
126. Id. at 1370. 
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(1997). 
128. Id. 
129. WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND 
PARTNERS § 10.02 (1997); Lawrence Lokken, Partnership Allocations, 41 TAX L. REV. 
545 (1986); Michael J. Close & Dan A. Kusnetz, The Final Section 704(b) Regulations: 
Special Allocations Reach New Heights of Complexity, 40 TAX LAW. 307 (1987). 
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nerships.130  However, on closer scrutiny it becomes apparent that 
this appearance is illusory. 
The issuance of regulations is a collaborative process of re-
sponse and review.131  Congress enacts tax legislation phrased in 
broad, general terms.132  The task of making many statutory provi-
sions meaningful to specific transactions is often assigned to the 
regulations.133  These, in turn, are developed by a process of no-
tice, the issuance of Temporary Regulations through consultation 
with the tax bar and other interested persons.134  When 
subsequently issued as Final Regulations, particularly those 
involving partnerships, the Regulations generally reflect the 
resolution of tensions between the taxpayers and the Service over 
transactions which in form are permitted by some provisions of the 
Code, but in substance result in tax-avoidance.135  For example, 
suppose a taxpayer’s partnership agreement provides that all of the 
depreciation allowance on a partnership asset is allocated to 
Partner A, an arrangement permitted by one provision of the 
Internal Revenue Code and the Uniform Partnership Act.136 
Without more, the Code provision governing depreciation would 
permit this arrangement for Partner A, even if she owned a .01 
percent interest in the partnership asset, Blackacre.137  She bears 
.01 risk in Blackacre and would claim all of a deduction associated 
with that asset.138  The Regulations reverse this outcome on an 
analysis of substance over form.139 
 
130. See Close, supra note 129. 
131. In I.R.C. § 7805 (1995), Congress has delegated the authority to promulgate 
Regulations to the Secretary of the Treasury. Such Regulations are issued initially as 
temporary regulations and are subjected to a process of public comment prior to being 
issued in final form, I.R.C. § 7805(e)(1). Generally, courts give great weight to these 
Regulations.  See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967)(finding limited scope of 
judicial review of Treasury Regulations); JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 25-26 (1997). 
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In these circumstances, it is difficult to identify innovation in a 
text largely descriptive of transactions structured by taxpayers and 
reviewed and re-characterized in the Regulations drafted by I.R.S. 
employees. Not infrequently, a phrase or an example will be the 
result of several rounds of negotiation.140 A fragment of tax law 
underscores this point.141  Partnership taxation is more complex 
than the taxation of individuals, trusts and estates, or corporations, 
because the Internal Revenue Code makes a dual characterization 
of the partnership.142  The partnership as such is not subject to in-
come tax liability because the partnership is not defined by the 
Code as a taxable entity.143  Instead it is treated as an aggregation 
of partners, who are the ultimate taxpayers.144  However the Inter-
nal Revenue Code also views the partnership as an entity to the ex-
tent that it serves as the computation unit to determine the charac-
ter and the amount of partnership income attributable to each 
taxpayer-partner.145  Complexity is added to the calculation of each 
partner’s distributive share of the partnership’s income-
determining items by the provision that permits the partnership 
agreement to control the allocation of income, gain, loss, deduc-
tion, or credit to the partners.146  A text on partnership taxation de-
scribes the required calculations as follows: “[T]he partner-
ship . . .[is required] to keep two sets of accounts—one for “tax” 
purposes and the other for “book” purposes. The “book” items re-
flect the economic arrangement of the partners. The “tax” 
items. . .must be determined with reference to the partners’ dis-





143. I.R.C. § 701 (“A partnership as such shall not be subject to the income tax im-
posed by this chapter.”). 
144. Id. 
145. I.R.C. § 702(b) (“The character of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or 
credit. . .shall be determined as if. . .[it] were realized directly from the source. . .realized 
by the partnership.”). 
146. See I.R.C. § 704(b) (“A partner’s distributive share of income, gain, loss, de-
duction, or credit. . .shall be determined in accordance with the partner’s interest in the 
partnership (determined by taking into account all facts and circumstances). . . .”). 
147. S.A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, 174 (3d. ed. 
1992). 
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This tax text also notes the limited guidance offered to taxpay-
ers by the Internal Revenue Code in making these complex calcu-
lations, noting that “[t]he Code itself provides no guidance, the al-
location question has historically been answered in regulations and 
rulings issued by the Treasury.”148 
In contrast to the Code, the regulations do indeed supply guid-
ance.149 Comprising fifty-three pages in the Code of Federal Regu-
lations this comprehensive text, coupled with copious examples, 
sets out in elaborate detail the items to be adjusted and the method 
of their adjustment.150  A comparison between these regulations 
and the claims of the Signature patent reveals a parallel struc-
ture.151  This comparison shows that the patent claims closely ap-
proximate the form and substance of the regulations.152  In these 
circumstances, the analysis of the State Street Bank opinion does 
not illuminate the innovative contribution.153  The opinion ad-
dressed this issue only in terms of the result, as follows: 
Today, we hold that the transformation of data, represent-
ing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series 
of mathematical calculations . . . constitute a practical ap-
plication of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calcula-
tion, because it produces a useful, concrete and tangible re-
sult —a final share price momentarily fixed for recording 
and reporting purposes and even accepted and relied upon 
 
148. See DEWEY, supra note 46, at 186. 
149. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.704-1 (1997) (covering the determination of tax liability for 
partners’ distributive share). 
150. Id. 
151. See I.R.C. § 706(d)(2)(A)  (requiring a daily computation of any change in 
each partner’s interest in the partnership as of the close of each day) & Treas. Reg. § 
1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(requiring the allocation of income, gain, loss, or deduction in the daily 
calculation of each partner’s capital account). See also, Richard H. Stern, Scope of Pro-
tection Problems With Patent and Copyrights on Methods of Doing Business, 10 Ford-
ham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 105 (1999).  In his Appendix A, Stern notes the par-
allel format between the requirements set out in the Treasury Regulations and the claims 
of the Signature Financial patent. This parallelism suggests little, if any, originality on the 
part of the patentee. Moreover, were this patent to cover the most efficient method of 
compliance with these complex calculations, a taxpayer could be required to obtain a li-
cense in order to comply with the Internal Revenue Codes mandate timely to file an accu-
rate Form 1040. 
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.704 (text and examples). 
153. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1373. 
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by regulatory authorities . . . .154 
The opinion thus finds a useful, concrete and tangible result 
without identifying the invention which produced it.155  The contri-
bution of Boes, the software programmer, was not explored in the 
opinion.156 The absence in the opinion of any reference to the 
originality of the program written by Boes leaves one to wonder 
whether, as a software program, it was novel and innovative or 
trivial. The opinion obscures the basic patent inquiry of finding 
non-obviousness in either the program qua software program or in 
the method of deriving the information required by the regula-
tions.157 The opinion does not apply the Patent Act’s requirement 
of identifying the novel, non-obvious advance over the prior art.158  
The invention remains unstated.  Moreover, it is difficult to distill 
it from the opinion. The conception and structure of Boes’ program 
was dictated by its function of accomplishing compliance with the 
Income Tax Regulations.159  Boes’ program closely follows the 
regulations. Accordingly, the question remains whether this case 
 
154. Id. (emphasis added). 
155. The comparison of the patent claims with the Regulations could support the 
conclusion that neither the drafters of the Regulations nor the software programmer had 
contributed much that would be considered novel or original. First issued in 1960, these 
Regulations have subsequently been revised eleven times. In their present form, these 
Regulations reflect the accretion of governmental responses to taxpayers statements and 
objections. Overall, the objective of the government has been to identify those partner-
ship transactions that reduce tax liability as formal arrangements lacking economic sub-
stance. One tax authority has described the interactive nature of the process of writing 
regulations as follows: 
The Secretary of the Treasury has delegated the authority to issue regulations to 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, subject to the approval of the Assistant 
Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy. Typically, a regulation is published in 
the Federal Register as a notice of Proposed rulemaking. Comments from the 
public are received, and often a public hearing is held, before final regulations 
are published. . . 
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 73 (2d ed. 1988). See also, Northern 
Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied 111 S.Ct. 296 
(1990) (invalidating a method patent for failure to disclose best mode.) Failure to disclose 
all the details may cause a court to conclude that the claims fail the non-obvious require-
ment. 
156. See State Street Bank, 149 F.3d 1368, and supra text accompanying note 155. 
157. Id. 
158. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d 1368. 
159. See Stern, supra note 151 at Appendix A. 
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offers a sufficient platform for the announcement of a broad, new 
rule.160  Equally troublesome is the hint in the opinion that a 
method of compliance with regulatory authorities can serve as an 
element of support for patent protection.161  Assume that a second 
programmer writes a new program to execute the same function, 
knowing only that another program exists for these calculations.  
Assume further that the second program, made freely available to 
the public, contained only minor variations in the Boes method of 
calculations because both programs are bound by the structure of 
the regulations.162  If broad scope is given to the Boes patent, 
might a taxpayer’s use of a freely available, efficient method of 
complying with a government regulation pose the risk of liability 
for patent infringement? 
A further source of unease over this opinion is its potential for 
generating a boom in business method patents.163  The broad lan-
guage of this opinion would support the patenting of the sales 
methods of Dell, Gateway, and Circuit City in the above examples.  
If the distribution method of each were reduced to a software pro-
gram described as a means of calculating a maximizing strategy for 
increasing sales revenue and minimizing overhead costs, these 
programs could meet the test of the opinion. Moreover, this deci-
sion obligates the patent bar to advise enterprise managers of the 
availability of this new protection for their business methods. This 
protection extends to fields other than financial services.164  Bank-
ing, insurance, and accounting are most likely to be immediately 
involved in seeking such patent protection. However, protection is 
unlikely to be limited to these sectors because the patent bar has an 
obligation to advise their clients of the availability of patent protec-
tion of their methods of doing business. So the impact of the State 
Street Bank decision serves as the proverbial pebble in a pond 
causing a series of widening concentric circles of business method 
patents. Seminars by patent practitioners could generate awareness 
among business managers not only of the prospect of protection for 
 
160. Id.; see also, supra text accompanying note 155. 
161. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d at 1368. 
162. Id. 
163. See “Boom”, supra note 7. 
164. See supra note 22 and text accompanying notes 13-20. 
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their business methods, but also of the potential revenue from li-
censing them. Patents granted could become patents enforced or 
licensed.  Litigation expenses and royalty payments become new 
transaction costs of doing business and such costs may in some 
market circumstances, negatively impact consumer welfare. 
Where is the societal benefit from this extension of patent pro-
tection to business methods?  Assume that in this example, Dell, 
Gateway, and Circuit City all are granted patents, with Dell being 
the first to file. What claims might Dell raise against the others? If 
Dell’s patent is given broad scope on the authority of State Street 
Bank, are consumers better served?  If, in these circumstances, all 
patentees meet and come to a cross licensing, pooling arrangement, 
are consumers more likely to be benefited?  If so, do patents on 
business methods have the potential of inducing cartel arrange-
ments among competitors?  Are some consumers likely to bear the 
increased transaction costs from the resulting fees and charges?  
These are questions to consider as the process of patenting busi-
ness methods goes forward. 
What guidance can be derived from the fragment of economic 
analysis presented here?  Overall, from the perspective of the 
model developed earlier, the broad grant of patent protection for 
methods of doing business is something of a square peg in a sink-
hole of uncertain dimensions. Nowhere in the substantial literature 
on innovation is there a statement that the United States economy 
suffers from a lack of innovation in methods of doing business. 
Compared with the business practices of comparable economies 
we seem to be innovators in distribution and in the service indus-
tries. By the casual empiricism of counting the number of graduate 
business schools, the United States is ahead of other developed 
economies. This datum, plus the substantial enrollment of foreign 
students in the graduate schools of business in the United States, 
permits the inference that business methods in this country as pres-
ently practiced, are considered innovative and attractive, despite 
the prior absence of patent protection.165 
There is, moreover, substantial anecdotal evidence that compe-
tition alone serves as a sufficient spur to innovation in business 
 
165. See Riordan, supra notes 14 and 23. 
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methods. The rapid cluster of development in the following busi-
nesses casts doubt on the need for the added incentive of patents. 
Consider the growth of fast food restaurants, self-service gasoline 
stations, quick oil change facilities, supermarkets for food and of-
fice supplies, automatic teller devices and other banking services, 
electronic fund transfers, supplemental insurance for physician 
services, and alternatives for long-distance telephone services. To 
the argument that the economy of the United States would function 
even better with such patent protection, the model casts doubt. The 
case for broad patent protection, plausible as a matter of theory, 
has been qualified by the historical/empirical studies of industries 
in which there had been broad patent protection.166 
Moreover, conceding the possibility of free-riding as well as 
outright piracy of business methods, the absence of patent protec-
tion would not leave a total void of legal remedies.  There are a va-
riety of federal and state alternative regimes of protection.167  
Copyright, misappropriation, unfair competition, and deceptive 
practices statutes may serve as alternative means of protection.168  
These regimes may serve to furnish the incentive of protection as 
well as a means of redress against “dirty tricks” by competitors.169  
For example, the software program in which the Boes invention 
was embedded could have been protected by copyright, although if 
tested in litigation, the scope of copyright protection would likely 
have been limited to the literal code in Boes’ program.170 
 
166. See supra note 38.  Leading economic scholars of industrial organization  have 
expressed their preference for the balance between patent protection and the competitive 
norm, as follows: 
What is needed for rapid technical progress is a subtle blend of competition and 
monopoly, with more emphasis in general on the former than the latter, and 
with the role of monopolistic elements diminishing when rich technological 
opportunities exist. 
FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE, 660 (3d. ed. 1990). 
167. Id. 
168. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995). 
169. Id. 
170. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-8 
(3d Cir. 1983); Computer Associates, Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 
1992) (holding literal elements of computer programs, such as source and object code  
protectible). 
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Indeed, a comparison of copyright protection with patent pro-
tection reveals some potential for over-inclusive protection under 
the patent regime.  Copyright has both statutory and case law limit-
ing doctrines.171  Thus, the copyright cases afford minimal protec-
tion for works of low creativity such as directories and other fac-
tual compilations.172  The Copyright Act itself bars protection for 
“any idea, procedure, process, system. . .concept, principle, or dis-
covery . . . .”173  Commonplace standard forms of expression, 
ideas, elements dictated by efficiency considerations, and elements 
taken from the public domain are also filtered from copyright 
protection.174  Courts in deciding copyright cases have balanced 
the need for copyright protection with a regard for the competitive 
process.175  By comparison with the nuanced treatment afforded by 
the copyright regime, the Patent Act as interpreted by Judge Rich 
in State Street Bank, is a grant of broad scope, which may or may 
not be cabined in subsequent cases by general patent principles.176 
 
171. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1994). 
172. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (compiling 
a white page telephone book in alphabetical format fails the Constitutional requirement of 
originality). See Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Repre-
sentation of Facts, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (1963) (noting a thin protection for fact inten-
sive works); Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection 
for Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990); No “Sweat?” Copyright and 
Other Protection of Works of Information after Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 338 (1992) (exploring alternative regimes for the protection of data bases and other 
fact works). 
173. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1994), codifying Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) 
(copyright law protects only expression; the accounting system expressed is directed to 
the patent regime in dictum). 
174. See Computer Associates, 982 F.2d at 710 (limiting the scope of copyright pro-
tection to exclude reduced by a filtering process removing items common to industry 
practice). 
175. See Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(finding copying to be fair use where the grant of protection would have dampened com-
petition); Wainwright Securities v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 
1977) (granting protection to bar “chiseling for personal profit.”) 
176. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (citing with approval State Street Bank statement that calculations integral to a 
machine or process are subject matter if applied in a useful manner). In H.R. 1907, 
passed by the House on August 4, 1999, Congress seemingly undertook, albeit indirectly, 
to underscore that business method patents are like all other method patents with regard 
to the determination of the date of invention. This reference is not likely to serve as a lim-
iting doctrine for business method patents. H.R. 1907, 106th Cong. § 273 (1999). 
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In addition to copyright protection, there is protection under the 
misappropriation rationale.177  In 1918, the Supreme Court struck 
down an unfair method of doing business by announcing the amor-
phous doctrine of a quasi-property interest in uncopyrighted news, 
dubbing such a taking a misappropriation.178  Although the federal 
misappropriation doctrine has been subjected to substantial criti-
cism, courts and legislatures have relied upon it.179  In the current 
session of Congress, H.R. 354 has been introduced to protect data 
base collections on a misappropriation theory.180  In addition to the 
misappropriation doctrine announced in the INS case, there is a 
body of federal and state statutory restrictions on unfair competi-
tion.181  Limited federal protection of business methods may be 
available under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for the established 
trade designation of business methods.182 
 
177. See Jones, supra note 29. 
178. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)( INS 
took advantage of the time differential between New York and California to copy a com-
petitor’s news stories in New York and to telegraph them in time for publication as its 
own in California). 
179. Dennis Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third Intellectual Property Paradigm, 
94 COLUM L. REV. 2594 (1994); Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property 
and the Legacy of International News Service, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411 (1983); Leo J. 
Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrines as a Competitive Norm of Intellectual Property 
Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991); See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) 
(reporter who acted on confidential information gathered for news stories for personal 
gain in the securities markets held to have defrauded newspaper employer by misappro-
priating property of the newspaper). 
180. H.R. 354, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999), proposing to add a new chapter 14 to 
Title 17, “Misappropriation of Collections of Information.” See 57 (BNA) PATENT, 
COPYRIGHT, AND TRADEMARK J. 226, 233 (1999). 
181. See Doliner v. Brown, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 692 (1986)(holding the use of public 
information to competitive advantage not actionable); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 1 (1990) (makes actionable the appropriation of trade values, among 
other competitive harms). 
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1998) (barring the use of any “term, name, symbol, or de-
vice” which is likely to cause confusion as to the “commercial activities by another per-
son.”); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983); 
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v, Blue Cross of Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 58 (1990) (permitting a Lanham Act claim against derogatory characterization 
of a competitor’s method of health care delivery). 
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III.  ANTITRUST DOCTRINES OF PATENT MISUSE AS A LIMITATION 
Given the weakness of the case for patent protection of busi-
ness methods, the quest for means of limiting the scope of the State 
Street Bank opinion may turn to the doctrine of patent misuse. This 
equitable doctrine, developed by judges in antitrust cases, evolved 
as a set of independent principles in the late Nineteenth Century.183  
Because patent misuse was developed in cases involving transac-
tions of assignment, of licensing, or of the sale of products em-
bodying patented technology, the doctrine remains bounded by its 
transactional origins. As this doctrine functions, a patent transac-
tion can be brought under patent misuse scrutiny by an antitrust en-
forcement agency as a violation of the antitrust laws, or an antitrust 
violation may be raised by a vendee/licensee/assignee as a defense 
to a suit for infringement. When patent misuse is invoked, courts 
are faced with the task of resolving the tension between the mo-
nopoly attributes of a patent and the antitrust law’s policy of com-
petition as the preferred norm in markets. The doctrine of patent 
misuse evolved as judges began to impose limits on the scope of 
patent rights and to accord  priority to the policy of competition by 
invoking the Sherman Act.184 
Accordingly, it might appear that the danger of an overly ex-
pansive application of business method patents would be checked 
by the doctrine of patent misuse, however, this restraint is unlikely 
to materialize. A survey of the principal categories of patent mis-
use shows that this doctrine is steeped in its transactional origins 
involving patents for tangible products and processes. Thus, there 
are no branches of the patent misuse doctrine that are immediately 
 
183. See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873) (holding patentee’s geo-
graphic use restriction held unenforceable);Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d. 661 
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding patentee’s tying arrangement unenforceable). See generally 
Donald F. Turner, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 76 YALE L. J. 267 (1966); Samuel Oddi, Contributory Infringe-
ment/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 73 (1982); 
Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 
(1984). 
184. Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (1994); see also Norman E. Rosen, 
Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Pendulum: Recent Developments at the Interface 
between the Antitrust and Intellectual Property Laws, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (1994) (re-
viewing antitrust developments relating to intellectual property rights). 
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applicable to patents on business methods which involve neither 
physical assets and processes nor transactions of sale, license, or 
assignment. Sales of products embodying patented technology, 
however, could invoke the traditional misuse doctrines if such 
sales or licenses are coupled with conditions such as a stated resale 
price, a promise not to develop competing technology, or a re-
quirement also to buy an unpatented item.185  Thus, to extend pat-
ent misuse principles to business method patents would require ju-
dicial extension beyond existing misuse analysis. 
Even if there were the judicial inclination to extend the patent 
misuse analysis to business method patents, some doctrinal modi-
fication would be required, since business patents are distinctive in 
their direct application to the conduct and practices of market ac-
tors. In contrast, the patents around which the patent misuse doc-
trine was developed generally involved the use of the patent to 
condition subsequent conduct of others such as an assignee, a 
vendee, or a licensee.  While current patent misuse analysis does 
reach collusive behavior among patentees,186 business method pat-
ents more immediately impact competition because they restrict 
the market behavior of existing and potential competitors. 
This effect of a business method patent can be illustrated by a 
modification of the above example. Assume that a patent was is-
sued to Circuit City on its method of selling computers. Would 
patent counsel to a sporting goods retailer be able to write an opin-
ion letter assuring that retailer’s management of no exposure to li-
ability for infringement in the following circumstances? Assume 
further that the client/sporting goods retailer receives a letter from 
counsel to Circuit City advising that the computer terminal kiosk 
used to order custom-made skis was infringing Circuit City’s pat-
ented method of direct sale and distribution. In this circumstance 
Circuit City could challenge the direct sales method not only of 
competing electronic device sellers, but also of vendors of items 
 
185. See infra text accompanying notes 198; see also In Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. 
Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding copyright misuse in license provisions 
promising not to develop competing products and to pay royalties beyond the statutory 
duration of the copyright). 
186. See United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), 
aff’d, 32 U.S. 319 (1947). 
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not presently being sold by Circuit City, as well as sellers of items 
unrelated to the electronics business. 
Enforcement of the business method patent in the State Street 
Bank case, unless coupled with price-fixing, tying, or other anti-
competitive conduct, would not invoke any of the traditional patent 
misuse doctrines categories.187  Accordingly, the misuse doctrine 
would not be readily at hand as a limiting principle for business 
method patents. Adaptation of patent misuse principles to business 
method patents would require substantial judicial innovation. 
In the current state of its development, patent misuse doctrines 
only bar actions indirectly affecting competitors through transac-
tions not directly involving marketing methods.188  The prior ski 
distribution example makes this point. Patent misuse would bar the 
ski manufacturer (holding a patent on the ski) from controlling the 
resale price of the skis,189 from claiming royalties from a licensee-
manufacturer (on a patented ski feature) beyond the term of the 
patent,190  from requiring the retailer to purchase an unpatented ar-
ticle as a condition of the license to resell the patented skis,191 from 
conditioning the license to resell on a promise not to deal with a 
competitor,192 from refusing to license patents individually, but 
only in a bundle,193 and from charging differential royalties to 
competing licensees so as to impair licensee competition.194 Since 
none of these limitations would be directly applicable to the exam-
ple posed above, the need for judicial innovation would seem to be 
required. 
 
187. See, e.g., Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, ANTITRUST LAW 704, 707 
(1996). 
188. Id. 
189. See United States v. Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). 
190. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); Meehan v. PPG Industries, 802 
F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1986). 
191. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
192. See Dubuit v. Harwell Enterprise, 336 F. Supp. 1184 (D.N.C. 1971). 
193. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Corp., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (bundle 
licensing permitted if done for convenience, absent coercion). 
194. Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193 (D.Wash. 1966); LaPeyre v. F.T.C., 
366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that differential royalties may constitute both pat-
ent misuse and an unfair method of competition in violation of § 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act). 
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A judge undertaking the task of adapting existing patent misuse 
principles to the new task would encounter a further complication. 
Since the 1980’s there has been a debate among judges as to the 
very foundation of patent misuse as a body of rules. On the one 
side, Judge Richard Posner has written that refinements of antitrust 
analysis should absorb and supersede the traditional doctrine of 
patent misuse.195  As he explained: 
The [patent misuse] doctrine arose before there was any 
significant body of federal antitrust law, and reached ma-
turity long before that law. . .attained its present scope. 
Since the antitrust laws as currently interpreted reach every 
practice that could impair competition substantially, it is 
not easy to define a separate role for a doctrine also de-
signed to prevent an anticompetitive practice—the abuse of 
a patent monopoly.196 
In the Federal Circuit, there was initially a split on this issue.197  
One 1986 opinion of the Federal Circuit seemingly agreed with 
Judge Posner, explaining that, “[r]ecent economic analysis ques-
tions the rationale of holding any licensing practice per se anti-
competitive.”198  In a later opinion that year, however, the court 
said that a Supreme Court ruling would be required in order for 
lower courts to abandon patent misuse as an independent doctrine, 
stating, “[w]e are bound. . .to adhere to existing Supreme Court 
guidance in this area. . . .”199 
Subsequently, the Federal Circuit moved toward the Posner po-
sition in Mallinckrodt.200  There, the Federal Circuit upheld a “sin-
gle use” label on a refillable medical device sold by the manufac-
turer to a hospital.201  In reversing the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for the defendant hospital which breached the 
condition, Judge Newman characterized the lower court’s opinion 
 
195. USM v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982). 
196. Id. at 511. 
197. See, e.g., Windsurfing International v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 
1986); Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffert, 803 F.2d. 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
198. Windsurfing International, 782 F.2d at 1001, n.9 (1986). 
199. Senza-Gel Corp., 803 F.2d at 665, n.5 (1986). 
200. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
201. Id. at 708. 
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as mistakenly resting on patent misuse.202  In her opinion, she rea-
soned that antitrust principles had “trumped” the long standing 
“first sale” doctrine.203  As she stated, “[t]he appropriate question 
is whether Mallinckrodt’s restriction is reasonably within the pat-
ent grant, or whether the patentee has ventured beyond the patent 
grant. . .into. . .having an anti-competitive effect not justifiable un-
der the rule of reason.”204 
The Mallinckrodt decision can be interpreted as expressing a 
preference for the Posner position because the court’s rationale 
draws on antitrust precedent unrelated to patent litigation.205  This 
opinion also can be viewed as reaching for the antitrust rule of rea-
son analysis to vacate the “first sale” doctrine, a long-standing, 
limiting principle of patent jurisprudence and one which is 
grounded on misuse principles.206  Accordingly, there is little rea-
son to anticipate that this panel of the Federal Circuit will under-
take to apply patent misuse principles to limit the scope of business 
method patents in the near future. 
Recently, the existence of an independent patent misuse doc-
trine was dealt another diminishing blow by the Joint Department 
of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Guidelines.207  In undertak-
ing to clarify the significance of intellectual property rights in anti-
trust analysis, the Guidelines clearly reject any role for an inde-




204. Id. at 708 (emphasis added); see also, Richard H. Stern, The Unobserved De-
mise of the Exhaustion Doctrine in U.S. Patent Law, 15 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 460 
(1993) (criticizing the opinion); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453 (1873); Bauer & 
Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 16 (1913) (announcing the first sale or exhaustion doc-
trine—the first sale permits the vendee to resell the patented item free of any conditions 
imposed by the patentee); the same analysis was applied to a copyright in Bobbs-Merrill 
Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
205. Judge Newman cites Continental TV v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977), for 
its holding that vertical restraints are to be judged as antitrust violations under the rule of 
reason. However, that case involved territorial restraints in the distribution of unpatented 
products.  Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 706. 
206. Id. 
207. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES 
(April 6, 1995), issued jointly by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission. 
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The agencies apply the same general antitrust principles to 
conduct involving intellectual property that they apply to 
conduct involving any other form of tangible or intangible 
property. . . .  Intellectual property has important character-
istics. . . that distinguish it from many other forms of prop-
erty. These characteristics can be taken into account by 
standard antitrust analysis, however, and do not require 
the application of fundamentally different principles.208 
CONCLUSION 
The broad sweep of the State Street Bank opinion remains a 
cause for concern. The doctrinal justification for such a reversal of 
the traditional treatment of business methods remains obscure, 
while the institutional impetus for expansion of patent protection is 
already apparent.209  This imbalance between justification and bur-
geoning use poses a dilemma for the decision-makers involved. 
While the PTO seems to have fully accepted the State Street Bank 
decision as a platform for the expansion of the grant of such pat-
ents, courts and perhaps Congress may yet perceive the need for 
restraint. For, despite the State Street Bank panel’s sweeping, un-
qualified rejection of the business method exception, caution is 
warranted. By failing to provide a rationale upon which a workable 
regime of such patents could be administered, the decision leaves 
considerable doubt as to the wisdom of rejecting the prior business 
method exception. Contemplation of some likely scenarios of the 
expansive protection of business methods among competitors does 
little to dispel the conclusion that the prior rule of exception, albeit 
inarticulate, did represent practical wisdom akin to an efficacious 
home remedy. Business method patents are so closely linked to in-
teractive market emulation as to distinguish them from the results 
of laboratory/experimental activity. In these circumstances, a care-
ful case by case analysis of business method claims is warranted. 
Courts should recognize the distinctive nature of business 
 
208. Id. at § 2.0 (emphasis added). 
209. See “Boom” supra note 7 (reporting a “boom” in business method patents 
which followed the State Street decision). See also, supra text following note 155 and 
supra pp. 64-67 for a description of some recent patents. 
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methods in terms of both origin and function. Business method 
patents pose a direct restraint on the conduct of competitors, actual 
and potential. The effect of the decision in the State Street Bank 
case is to announce patent protection without any suggestion of 
limitation. This decision is most disturbing for its lack of an orga-
nizing principle. It rejects the old rule and only suggests a need for 
the added incentive of patent protection. While it is inviting to in-
terpret the text of section 101 to include every aspect of human 
creativity, competitive markets are an arena in which such an in-
terpretation will not work well.210  Business methods differ from 
the bulk of patent claims in that business methods are developed in 
the arena of competition, rather than in a laboratory environment. 
Interactive emulation more than innovation is the driving force of 
business method changes. Insensitivity to this feature of business 
methods leads to a failure to strike the proper balance between the 
incentive/reward attributes of a patent and its potential for a mo-
nopoly, i.e. “competition-dampening uses.”211  Without some con-
straints, patents on business methods can become the source of 
multiplying royalty claims and burgeoning infringement litigation. 
Such claims can impede rather than induce competitive conduct; 
the resulting transaction costs are likely to impinge negatively on 
consumer welfare. 
Because this decision unleashed this new rule without analysis 
or explanation, it remains for courts, practitioners, and commenta-
tors to undertake the necessary adjustments required by the distinc-
tive nature of this subject matter. Minimizing the potentially anti-
competitive effects of business method patents noted in the exam-
ples above will require the application of some doctrines of limita-
tion. As presently constituted and interpreted, patent law does not 
readily provide such doctrines. In contrast with the Copyright 
Act,212 the Patent Act lacks defined limits on protectible subject 
matter.213  As noted earlier, the antitrust doctrine of patent misuse 
is not a likely source of limiting principles.214  While it is beyond 
 
210. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
211. See supra note 7 for a statement of the dual economic attributes of patents. 
212. 17 U.S.C §1 et seq. 
213. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
214. See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindenheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (C.A.9 1990) (holding copyright 
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the present scope to develop such doctrines, it is possible to sug-
gest some approaches. Copyright law offers several guides. For 
example, commonplace phrases (verbal or digital), fac-
tual/historical material, and trivial contribution are by case law ex-
cluded as protectible subject matter of copyright.215 These restric-
tions might translate into barring minor variations on traditional 
methods of delivery of products and of services from business 
method patent protection.  Similarly, section 102(b) of the Copy-
right Act excepts from protection, “any procedure, process, system 
[and] method of operation.”216  This limitation might be transposed 
to bar from patent protection recognized methods of accomplishing 
transactions. Thus, minor variations of established direct selling 
methods would not gain protection based solely on the mode of 
execution or on being applied to a new product or service. Such 
judicially-crafted limits could be developed on a case by case ba-
sis, were judges persuaded of the need for them. Such adjustments 
are not likely in the short run. 
More immediate limits can be procedural. For the reasons 
noted above, courts would do well to limit severely the grant of in-
junctive relief in these cases and to invoke the language of the 
State Street Bank decision prospectively, “business methods have 
been, and should have been subject to the same legal requirements 
for patentability as applied to any other process or method.”217  
 
protects author’s expression, and facts and ideas are not protected); see also, Pecarsky v. 
American Broadcasting Co., 603 F.Supp. 688 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding news reporter’s 
facts are not protected by copyright law). 
215. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
216. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1994). 
217. State Street Bank, 149 F.3d. at 1375. The perversity of granting patent protec-
tion to incremental variations in sales methods is illustrated by the injunction issued re-
cently by District Court Judge Marsha J. Pechman in Seattle. This injunction barred  Ba-
rnesandnoble.com from executing retail purchases on the Internet by “one click 
ordering,” the technique now common whereby a customer having previously registered 
with the vendor, clicks on a single button on the screen to order an item. Amazon.com, 
the plaintiff, had previously patented this “one click” method. Seemingly acknowledging 
the limited scope of the Amazon patent, the Judge wrote, “The evidence indicates that 
Barnesandnoble.com can modify its . . . [one click] feature with relative ease.” In re-
sponse, the chief executive of Barnesandnoble.com stated that the company would insti-
tute a new feature next year in which a button would appear on the screen next to a book 
title, by clicking on this button, the customer would see several options of payment and 
delivery. Clicking on any one of these buttons completes the order. 
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Computer-assisted methods of solving business problems should 
not become a shield against applying all of the Patent Act require-
ments to business method claims. 
 
 
See, New York Times, Dec. 3, 1999, at C24, col. 1. 
